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BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a summary judgment of the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County. The Honorable Kenneth
Rigtrup granted judgment in favor of Mark R. Cromar and Geneve D.
Cromar against Donald Dwyer in connection with a written indemnity
agreement which essentially passed on to Dwyer the judgment that
had been obtained by Larry M. and Greta M. Chaffin against the
1

Cromars.

Judge Rigtrup refused, however, to award the Cromars

attorneys' fees against Dwyer.
appeal follows.

It is from that refusal that this

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to §78-2a-

3(2)(k), Utah Code Annotated.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Did the trial court correctly interpret the Agreement
Surviving Real Estate Closing between the parties in refusing to
award attorneys fees for the enforcement of the Agreement itself.
2.

May the appellant raise for the first time on appeal

issues not presented to the Court below,

(See App. Brief p.2,

Issues Presented for Review #2).
These issues present matters of law to be determined by
the court under a correctness standard.
v.

Dalton,

Olson,

Gate City

808 P2d 1117 (Utah App. 1991);

Inc.,

Olson

Fed.

Sav.

v.

& Loan

Park-Craig-

815 P2d 1356 (Utah App. 1991).

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
This case raises an issue of the correct interpretation
of a contract.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by Mark and Geneve Cromar to enforce
the terms of an indemnity agreement against Donald Dwyer.

The

trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the Cromars and
against

Dwyer on the principal amount, plus interest

and

the

attorney's fees awarded to Larry and Greta Chaffin against the
Cromars.

The court refused to award to the Cromars the additional

2

attorney's fees they had incurred.

The Cromars appeal from that

adverse ruling.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Donald Dwyer accepts the statement of facts as set forth
in the Appellant's Brief.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO AWARD ATTORNEY'S FEES
TO THE CROMARS WAS CORRECT.
1.

An indemnity agreement is a contract.

In order to

recover attorney's fees on a contract action there must either be
a statute or an express provision in the contract authorizing such
an award.
2. In this case, the agreement limited Dwyer's liability
to those obligations contained in the trust deed and note.
3.
of

There was no provision in the Agreement for an award

attorney's

fees

incurred

in

enforcing

the

terms

of

the

Agreement.
4.

The overwhelming case law authority, and the law in

Utah, precludes

an award of attorney's

fees for enforcing

an

indemnification agreement unless the agreement so provides.
5.

Appellant is attempting to raise new issues on this

appeal.

3

ARGUMENT

I
APPELLANT IS ATTEMPTING TO RAISE ARGUMENTS
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
It has long been established that this Court will not
consider arguments on appeal which were not raised before the trial
court.

Olson

v.

Park-Craig-Olson,

Inc.,

1991).

Appellant, however, presents two arguments on appeal which

815 P2d 1356 (Utah App.

were not presented to the court below, i.e., (1) the Promissory
Note executed by Chaffins and Cromars was incorporated by reference
into the Agreement Surviving Real Estate Closing (hereinafter "the
Agreement"), and that, as a result, Dwyer's primary obligation to
pay the attorney's fees incurred by the Chaffins in collecting the
note was created by the attorney's fee language in the note itself
(App. Brief pp. 6, 7, 12) and (2) that the Cromars are entitled to
recover attorney's fees reasonably and necessarily

incurred in

defending against the principal claims covered by the Agreement,
(Point II, App. Brief, p. 19-21).

Even though Appellant should be

precluded from raising these issues on appeal, since they were not
argued below, Dwyer believes that the issues are not well taken.
A.

Dwyer Had no Duty to the Cromars Directly Under the

Promissory Note.

Dwyer was sued by the Cromars for breach of "his

promise to assume the note and to hold the Cromars harmless."
30).

(R.

Indeed, the Cromars acknowledge in their Brief that "summary

judgment based upon the Agreement Surviving Real Estate Closing was
4

entered in favor of the Cromars and against Dwyer on November 20,
1992."

(App. Brief

p.10).

It is clear, therefore, that

the

Cromars' claim below and the judgment entered against Dwyer was
based upon the Agreement and not upon the Promissory Note.

The

Cromars never contended in the court below that Dwyer had a duty to
pay attorney's fees directly to them under the terms of the note.
In

any

event, the

subject

note

provides

for

the

payment

of

attorney's fees to be paid by the maker to the holder1 of the note.
The

note

neither

contemplates

nor

requires

the

attorney's fees to a party other than the holder.

payment

of

The language of

the note provides:
"if this note is collected by an attorney
after default on the payment of principal or
interest, either with or without suit, the
undersigned
(the
Cromars)
jointly
and
severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses
of
collection
including
a
reasonable
attorney's fee." (Emphasis added).
Thus, the note required the Cromars to pay Chaffins' attorney's
fees in the event of suit. Pursuant to the Agreement, Dwyer agreed
to pay the attorney's fees assessed against the Cromars on behalf
of Chaffins.
against Dwyer.

Those fees are included in the Cromars' judgment
There is nothing in the note, however, requiring

Dwyer to pay attorney's fees to the maker of the note, the Cromars.
Since

the

Cromars

were

not

holders

1

of

the

note, the

note's

Section 70A-1-201(20) U.C.A. defines a holder as the person
in possession of an instrument if it is payable to bearer or to the
order of the person in possession.
5

provisions for payment, interestf or attorney's fees are of no
benefit to them2.
B.
any.

The Cromars are Not Entitled to Attorney's Fees, if

Incurred

to

Defend

Against

the

Chaffin's

Action.

In

requesting attorney's fees, the attorney for the Cromars presented
an affidavit which lumped together all of the attorney's
incurred. (R. 303-306).

fees

There is no way to tell from the Affidavit

whether any attorney's fees were actually incurred on behalf of the
Cromars

in defending

against

the Chaffins' claim;

indeed,

in

attempting to establish the amount of attorney's fees, Mr. Durham
stated in his Affidavit that they were for,
"factual
investigation;
preparation
of
documents, affidavits, pleadings, research and
correspondence with respect to the defense of
the action for summary judgment by Chaffins,
and the prosecution of the Motion for Summary
Judgment against Dwyer, including preparation
of judgment, conferences with client, and
opposing counsel regarding the same." (R. 304305) .
Counsel's

Affidavit

does not

state whether

the

"research

and

correspondence" relating to the defense of the Chaffin action was
directed to Chaff ins' attorney or was part of the demand made upon
Mr. Dwyer.

In addition, since the Affidavit presents a total lump

sum figure, there is no way to determine, from the record, the
amount, if any, for which the Cromars believe they are entitled to
compensation

for defending

Cromars,

no time, asked

2

at

against
the

the Chaffins' claim.

trial

court

for

an

award

The
of

The holder of an instrument may enforce payment, §70A-3-301

U.C.A.
6

attorney's fees relating to their alleged defense of the Chaffins'
claim. (R. 286-291).

Indeed, after the ruling of the court which

is the basis of this appeal, the Cromars made no attempt to request
a rehearing or to point out to the court that a portion of the
attorney's fees were allegedly incurred in defending against the
Chaffins' claim; rather, the Cromars remained silent although they
had ample opportunity to present the matter to the trial court.
Having failed to do so, they should be precluded from now raising
the issue.
II
AS SCRIVENER, THE DOCUMENT MUST BE CONSTRUED
AGAINST THE CROMARS
The Agreement was drafted by the Cromars' agent.

As a

result, any ambiguity in the document must be construed against the
Cromars and in favor of Dwyer.
America,
Century

Hoffman

669 P2d 410, (Utah 1983); Parks
Realty

Inc.,

v.

Life

Ins.

Enterprises

652 P2d 918 (Utah 1982).

Co.

of

Inc.

North
v.

New

Dwyer believes that

the document is clear. He agreed to indemnify the Cromars from the
obligations contained in the Second Trust Deed and Note.

To the

extent, however, that this Court believes that the language is
ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of Dwyer.
A.

The

Court's

Correct.

The court

Agreement

"holds

Interpretation

of

the

Document

in its Minute Entry determined

the

Seller

(Cromars)

harmless,

that

is
the

including

reasonable attorney's fees, from any and all obligations contained
in that certain first Trust Deed . . . and related note . . . and
from any and all obligations in that certain Second Trust Deed . .
7

and related notes." The court went on to state "it is clear that
Donald Dwyer only agreed to hold harmless the Cromars for all
obligations contained in the two trust deeds and notes, including
reasonable attorney's fees,"

(Emphasis added). (R. 319). Nothing

is contained in the Agreement authorizing the payment of attorney's
fees for its enforcement.

It has long been the law in Utah that an

award of attorney's fees is proper only if it is supported by
statute or by contract.

B&R Supply

442, 503 P2d 1216 (Utah 1972).

Company v. Bringhurst,

28 Ut2d

In the instant case there was no

contractual requirement that Dwyer pay the attorney's fees incurred
by the Cromars to enforce the Agreement.

The Cromars'

claim

against Dwyer is based solely upon paragraph d of the Agreement
which reads as follows,
"Buyer hereby holds seller harmless,

reasonable

attorney's

fees,

including

from any and all

obligations contained in that certain first
Trust
Deed
(including
the
"due-on-sale"
clause, in any) and related Note dated
September 20, 1974, in favor of Utah Mortgage
Loan Association Corporation in the original
amount of $75,000, copies of which are
attached hereto and incorporated herein, and
from any and all obligations in that certain
Second Trust Deed (including the "do-on-sale"
clause, if any) and related notes dated
November 6, 1979, in favor of Don L. Buehner,
Univest Corporation, Larry M. Chaffin and
Greta M. Chaff in, husband and wife, in the
original amount of $185,000, copies of which
are attached hereto and incorporated herein."
(Emphasis added). (R. 33-34).
Dwyer's agreement to hold the Cromar's harmless related to two
separate

encumbrances, the

first Trust Deed

in

favor of

Utah

Mortgage and Loan Corporation, and the Second Trust Deed in favor
of Don L. Buehner, Univest Corporation, Larry M. Chaffin and Greta
8

Chaffin.

The first Trust Deed was foreclosed and no action was

commenced on that debt.

The instant case relates only to the

Second Trust Deed and Note.

As the court correctly noted, under

the terms of the Agreement, Dwyer agreed to hold Cromars harmless
"from any and all obligations in that certain Trust Deed . . . and
related notes.

Dwyer's obligation to the Cromars, therefore, is

limited to obligations "(contained) in" the Second Trust Deed and
in the related note3.
Since there is nothing in either the Second Trust Deed or
the Chaffin note which would allow the Cromars to obtain an award
of attorney's fees against Dwyer, the ruling of the trial court
must stand.
B.

The Agreement Does Not Provide

Attorney's Fees for Enforcement.

for an Award of

Since Dwyer's obligation to hold

Cromars harmless is clearly limited to those obligations continued
in the Second Trust Deed and related notes, if Dwyer is to be held
responsible for the attorney's fees incurred by the Cromars in
enforcing the Agreement, the Agreement must contain a provision
awarding attorney's fees "incurred in enforcing the terms of this
agreement."
3

The Agreement contains no such provision; therefore,

Paragraph 19 of the Second Trust Deed provides that:

"Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, beneficiary,
(Chaffin), shall have the option to declare all sums secured hereby
immediately due and payable and foreclose on this Deed of Trust in
the manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real
property and beneficiary shall be able to recover in such
proceedings all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a
reasonable attorney's fee in such manner as shall be fixed by the
court."
9

the trial court correctly refused to assess against Dwyer the
attorney's fees that were incurred by the Cromars in enforcing the
Agreement against Dwyer.

Both the Second Trust Deed and the

Chaffin note provide for an award of attorney's fees only between
the direct

parties

to those documents.

In the

instant

case

attorney's fees were awarded to the Chaffins which are included in
the

Cromars' judgment

against

Dwyer.

There

is f

however,

no

provision in the Agreement for an award of attorney's fees to the
Cromars for attempting to enforce the Agreement against Dwyerf
although including such language would have been a simple matter4.
C. The Agreement is Redundant. Cromars argue that their
interpretation of the Agreement is the only correct one since any
other interpretation would create a redundancy in the Agreement.
The Agreement, however, is clearly

redundant.

The

Agreement

provides for the buyer (Dwyer) to hold the seller (Cromar) harmless
from "any and all obligations3" contained in the First and Second
Trust Deeds. The scrivener, however, added "including the v due-onsale' clause, if any" in reference to both the First and Second
Trust Deed obligations.

The term "any and all obligations" is all

encompassing5 and clearly includes any damages relating to any due4

"In the event of default of the terms of this agreement, the
party not in default may recover its costs, including reasonable
attorney's fees incurred in enforcing the terms . . .," or "if
either party fails to do as agreed, he shall pay all expenses of
enforcing this agreement, including reasonable attorney's fees,"
are two simple examples which would have obligated Dwyer to pay the
Cromar's attorney's fees.
5

"All" means (1) the whole of; (2) the greatest possible; (3)
every one of. "Any" when used as a pronoun means (1) any one or
ones; (2) any amount. The Merriam-Webster
Dictionary,
1974.

10

on-sale clause contained in either of the Trust Deeds.

Therefore,

the specific mention of the due-on-sale clauses in reference to
"any and all obligations" is clearly redundant.

The language used

by the scrivener relating to reasonable attorney's fees is similar
and is also redundant6.
obligations"

contained

Since Dwyer agreed to pay "any and all
in the Second

Trust

Deed, those

would

necessarily include both attorneys fees and due-on-sale damages
pursuant to the terms of the Trust Deed and Note, thus the specific
reference to attorney's fees and due on sale damages is redundant7.
Ill
ABSENT STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION, AN INDEMNITY
CAN NOT RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES IN A SUIT TO
ENFORCE THE INDEMNITY CONTRACT UNLESS THE
TERMS OF THE CONTRACT SO PROVIDE
An indemnification
contract.

agreement

is nothing more

than a

In spite of appellant's contentions to the contrary, it

is the well-established general rule that in the absence of express
statutory language, attorney's fees can not be recovered in a suit
to enforce an indemnity contract unless the terms of the contract
so provide.

The cases so holding are numerous.

them is the Tenth Circuit case of Vallejos
F2d 507 (10th Cir. 1978).

v.

C.E.

Prominent among
Glass

Co.,

583

That case involved a suit between a

contractor and a glass door fabricator and installer for indemnity.

6

Both the due-on sale clauses and the attorney's fee
provision are proceeded by the word "including."
Thus the term
"any and all obligations" is to include both attorneys fees and due
on sale damages as contained in the trust deed or note.
7

Dwyer
redundant.

submits

that

the
11

term

"any

and

all"

is

also

The court, citing a long line of cases, held that attorney's fees
incurred

in

establishing

recoverable.
(N.D.

the

right

In Rupp v. American

Crystal

of

indemnity

Sugar

Co.,

were

not

465 NW2d 614

1991), Plaintiff filed an indemnification action against a

contractor for damages it paid resulting from the death of an
employee.

There was a written

indemnification

clause

in the

contract between the parties covering "any and all claims for loss,
injury or damage."

The court held that,

"It is well established that an indemnitee may
not recover attorney's fees and expenses
incurred to establish the existence of an
obligation to indemnify unless the agreement
explicitly says otherwise."
Similar holdings can be found in D'Albora
University,

v.

Tulane

274 So.2d 825 (La. App. 1973), (fees attributable to

enforcing right [to indemnification] not recoverable since contract
did not provide for counsel fees in case of breach) ; Frankel
Burke's

Excavating,

recovery

of

Inc.,

attorney's

269 F.Supp. 1007 (E.D. Penn. 1967), (no
fees

in

indemnification demand); Tidewater
Materials

Co.,

269

v.

F.Supp.

connection

with

Construction

1000

(E.D.Va.

assertion

Corp.
1967),

v.

of

Southern
(right

to

indemnification for attorney's fees . . . does not include services
rendered in prosecuting the claim for indemnity).
Such is also the law of this State.
Ltd.

v.

Cessna

Aircraft

Co.,

Although

Hanover

758 P2d 443 (Utah App. 1988), dealt

with an implied right of indemnity under a strict liability theory
in tort and is thus factually far removed from the instant case,

12

this Court held that an indemnitee is not entitled to attorney's
fees incurred in establishing its right to indemnity. Id. at 450.
IV
APPELLANTS AUTHORITIES ARE INAPPOSITE HERE
In attempting to persuade this court to go contrary to
the great weight of authority, the Cromars argue that "two courts
have recently allowed an award of attorney's fees in litigation to
enforce indemnity rights."
cases of Chetopa

State

Bancshares,

App.1981) and Wuertz v.
1987).

(App. Brief 15). The Cromars cite the
Inc.

Tobias,

v.

Fox,

628 P2d 249 (Kan.

512 So.2d 1200 (La.App.5th Cir

Dwyer has no argument with the holdings of those cases but

they are clearly distinguishable from the facts present here.
Chetopa,

In

the Kansas court clearly recognized the general rule that

no attorney's fees would be awarded absent express contractual
language authorizing such award.

The Kansas court, however, held

that the language of the particular indemnity contract did provide
for an award of attorney's fees8.

In Wuertz the Louisiana Court

similarly recognized the general rule denying attorney's fees but
held that the contract language specifically provided for an award
of fees incurred in establishing the right of indemnity9.

As a

8

The precise contract language was: "Sellers agree to
indemnify and hold Stuckey harmless from and against any loss,
damage, deficiency or expense (including reasonable attorney's
fees) suffered or incurred by Stuckey at any time after the date
hereof, arising from, or as a result or in respect of, the breach
of any warranty, representation or covenant made by Seller . . ."
@257.
9

The contractual language provided that "Lessee also agrees
to pay all reasonable expenses and attorney's fees incurred by
Lessor in connection with the provisions of this paragraph. @1212.
13

result,

both

the

Chetopa

Wuertz

and

cases

are

clearly

distinguishable from the instant case since in the instant case
there

is

no contractual

language

allowing

the

award

incurred in establishing the right to indemnification.
also cite Manson-Osberg

Co. v. State,

Co.,

fees

Appellants

552 P2d 654 (Alaska 1976) and

argue that "public policy" requires an award of fees.
Osberg

of

In

Manson-

the decision by the Alaska court was predicated upon a

state workman's compensation

statute and upon a public

policy

determination that costs of enforcing an indemnity contract under
those terms were recoverable in Alaska10.

Obviously, in Utah there

is no such statute nor is there a long articulated public policy,
as there was in Alaska, awarding attorney's fees.

In fact, the

opposite is true. See Hanover

Co.,

443 (Utah App. 1988).

Ltd.

v.

Cessna

Aircraft

758 P2d

Although Chaffin's cases are of interest,

they relate to different facts and different contractual language,
applied in different states with different statutes then Utah.

As

a result, they are not persuasive.
CONCLUSION
Dwyer's

liability

to the Cromars

express terms of the Agreement.

is

limited

by

the

The Agreement obligated Dwyer to

hold the Cromars harmless from any and all obligations in the
Second Trust Deed and related notes.
10

There is no provision in the

In Alaska, attorney's fees are not an item of damages.
Alaska
R. Civ. P. §82.
The Alaska court recognized the general
rule but decided to go the other way.
The court grounded its
ruling on the case of Ransom v. Haner,
362 P2d 282 (Alaska 1961).
That case is a workman's compensation case, not an indemnification
case, and it is most difficult to glean from it the underpinnings
for the articulated "public policy."

14

Agreement for Dwyer to pay the attorney's fees incurred by the
Cromars in an attempt to enforce the terms of the Agreement against
Dwyer.

In Utah, there is no statute and no public policy requiring

the payment of such attorney's fees.
true.

In fact, the opposite is

It has long been held that absent a statute or express

contract language, attorneys fees are not awarded in a contract
dispute.

The general and overwhelming rule relating to indemnity

agreements is that absent statutory authorization an indemnitee can
not recover attorney's fees in a suit to enforce an indemnity
contract unless the terms of the contract so provide.
instant case, it did not.

The court

In the

should also reject

the

arguments and issues raised by Cromars for the first time on this
appeal

and

should

affirm

the

Order

of

Judge

Rigtrup

entirety.
Dated this

day of November, 1993.

^JUhia/9A'

J. THOMAS BOWEN'
Attorney for Appellee
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in

its

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 8th day of November, 1993,
I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLEE to be served upon the following by hand delivery or by
depositing copies thereof in the United States mail, postage paid,
addressed as follows:
Paul M. Durham
G. Richard Hill
Durham Evans & Jones
50 South Main Street, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
With courtesy copies to:
Daniel W. Anderson
Laura L. Moser
Fabian & Clendenin
215 South State Street, 12th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151
Stephen W. Brinton
Reeve, Brinton & Patterson
151 East 5600 South, Suite 320
Murray, Utah 84107
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
LARRY M. CHAFFIN and
GRETA M. CHAFFIN,
Plaintiffs,

ADDENDUM TO
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

vs.
MARK R. CROMAR and
GENEVE D. CROMAR,
Defendants, Third-party
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Civil No. 930539-CA

vs.
DONALD DWYER,
Third-party Defendant,
Fourth-party Plaintiff,
and Appellee,
vs.
GREG L. WINGET, BRENT E. WINGET,
JEN S. WINGET, RIVERVIEW PLAZA
ASSOCIATES LTD., and MERRILL TITLE
COMPANY,
Fourth-party Defendants.

Priority No. 15

=

WHEREAS:.
1. DONALD DWYER, (hereinafter referred to as -Buyer"),

is about

to purchase from MARK R. CROMAR and GENEVE D. CROMAR, (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "Seller"), the real property known as 2119 South Regent
28 East 2100 South
Street,/Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah;
2.

Buyer and Seller desire that certain promises survive the closing

of said real property and the delivery of the final deed of reconveyance;

NOW THEREFORE, In consideration of Buyer paying the purchase price of
said real property and in consideration of Seller conveying said real
property to Buyer, Buyer and Seller hereby agree to the following:
a.

Buyer and Seller understand that PARAMOUNT TITLE CORPORATION
cannot guarantee or verify the figures pertaining to the first
Trust Deed and Note 1n favor of UTAH MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION
and the Second Trust Deed and Notes in favor of DON L. BUEHNER,
UNIVEST CORPORATION, LARRY M.CHAFFIN and GRETA M. CHAFFIN,his wi
If the figures used 1n the related settlement statements are
inaccurate, Buyer and Seller mutually agree to make appropriate
adjustements.

b.

Seller guarantees that the note secured by said first Trust
Deed 1s current to and Including the monthly payment due May
1, 1983.

c.

Seller guarantees that the notes secured by said second Trust
Deed are current to and Including the monthly payments due
June 1, 1983.

d.

Buyer hereby holds Seller harmless, Including reasonable
attorney's fees, from any and all obligations contained
in that certain first Trust Deed (Including the "due-on-sale"
clause, if any), and related Note dated September 20, 1974,
1n favor of UTAH MORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION, in the original
amount of $475,000.00, copies of which are attached hereto

and

Incorporated herein, and from any and all obligations In that
certain Second Trust Deed (Including the "due-on-sale" clause,
if any) and related Notes dated November 6, 1979, in favor of
DON L. BUEHNER, UNIVEST CORPORATION, LARRY M.CHAFFIN and
GRETA M. CHAFFIN, husband and wife 1n the original amount of
(continued..)

$185,000.00, copies of which are attached hereto
and incorporated herein.
e.

The matters set forth herein shall survive the closing of the
transaction,and the yecpwtyanee ef fcht pm'thait WUIILJ JL-J sf**
DATED this

day of June, 1983.

+*tmyst in fa*o» a* SalUi L A E L J I L J at trlnring.

'• *>b
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Third Judicial District

NOV 2 0 1992
Paul M. Durham (0939)
DURHAM & EVANS
Attorneys for Defendants
and Third-Party Plaintiffs
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2424

SAi-TI

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LARRY M. CHAFFIN and GRETA M.
CHAFFIN,

j\?r>\qM
\-H-R3-300p-w

Plaintiffs,
vs.

JUDGMENT

MARK R. CROMAR and GENEVE D.
CROMAR,
Defendants and
Third-Party Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 900906903CN

vs.
DONALD DWYER,

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Third-Party Defendant
and Fourth-Party
Plaintiff,
vs.
GREG L. WINGET, BRENT E.
WINGET, JEN S. WINGET,
RIVERVIEW PLAZA ASSOCIATES,
LTD., and MERRILL TITLE
COMPANY,
Fourth-Party Defendants

000315

The Court having granted the motion for summary judgment of
third party plaintiffs Mark R. Cromar and Geneve D. Cromar against
third party defendant Donald Dwyer,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that third party
plaintiffs Mark R. Cromar and Geneve D. Cromar ("the Cromars") be
awarded judgment against third party defendant Donald Dwyer as
follows:
1.

For damages in the sum of $83,108.87 plus 12% per annum

interest from and after December 13, 1991, until paid;

costs

of

$95.00.

ynr1-hrrmnrnf

thft Court—finds.—that* it—rs

rftnnonnbly nmH ripnt^f^ therft Tnay-jjr rnir, Mfi Hillftwrlil\ frn—tm^l^rfr
fehe-judgmea^-l^) be ggftgded in th^g=e€txuii, ululudingppgSxiiblo-cosfcc
and—3rega±=f«e«sr

This judgment shall also cover such additional

costs «KHj.egalfrfrtrcincurred in pursuit of the collection of this
judgment.

The Cromars are entitled to supplement the foregoing

nnrn^wtiy wfcf i dflTrj t filnrl with tihn Pinirl fur mlriitionnl rrt+iM imyfi'
feeo-'^ind- costs which may arise in the future.
3.
the

Plaintiff is also entitled to interest on the judgment at

legal

rate

satisfied.
DATED this

for

judgments

it)

hf

CxP

until

this

judgment

has

been

*

day of -S*p«SfcHMr, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

Judge^Kenneth Rigt#up
D i s t r i c t Judge
/

000316

Third Judicial District

Paul M. Dursam (0939)
DURHAM & EVANS
Attorneys for Defendants
and Third-Party Plaintiffs
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2424

NOV 2 0 1992

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LARRY M. CHAFFIN and GRETA M. ]
CHAFFIN,
Plaintiffs,

vs.

>

MARK R. CROMAR and GENEVE D.
CROMAR,

]
)

Defendants and
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.

ORDER

Civil No. 900906903CN
;

DONALD DWYER,

i

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Third-Party Defendant
and Fourth-Party
Plaintiff,

vs.
GREG L. WINGET, BRENT E.
WINGET, JEN S. WINGET,
RIVERVIEW PLAZA ASSOCIATES,
LTD., and MERRILL TITLE
COMPANY,

]

Fourth-Party Defendants.

000327

Having considered memoranda of both counsel regarding the
objection of third party defendant Donald Dwyer to an award of
attorneys' fees to third party plaintiffs Mark R. Cromar and Geneve
D. Cromar,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that third party
defendant Donald Dwyer's objection is J&EaS&e©.
DATED this

ZO

day of Saptomber, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

Judged Kenneth Rigtijtfp
D i s t r i c t Judge

r

000328

NOV 2 0 1992
ADDENDUM D

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY - RULE 4-501
RULING

LARRY M. CHAFFIN and GRETA M.
CHAFFIh,
Plaintiffs,

CIVIL NO.

900906903

vs.
MARK R. CROMAR and GENEVE D.
CROMAR,
Defendants and Third
Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
DONALD DWYER,
Third Party Defendant and
Fourth Party Plaintiff,
vs.
GREG L. WINGET, et al.,
Fourth Party Defendants.

The Court has reviewed third party plaintiff's Memorandum
in Support of Attorney's Fees in Proposed Judgment, the third
party

defendants'

Memorandum

Reply

to

Third

in Support of Award

Party

Party

of Attorney's

Plaintiff's

Fees and third

party defendant Donald Dwyer's Notice of Objection to Proposed
Judgment.

000313

CHAPPZK V. CBOMAK

A career reading o f the Agreement Surviving
Closing entered b e t w e e n t h e C r o m a r s an(j D o n a i d ^
about July

I4,

R eal

Estate

^

^

1983 discloses that Buyer Dwyer:

hereby
holds
Seller
(Cromars)
h»^„i
including reasonable attorney"' feel
J™'
any and all obligations contained!; ^ °?
certain first Tr,,=t n.„.» '
....
/hlt
Note. . . and fro- any and'al'l „„", . " i ? ^
9aU
in that certain Second7 Trust Deed
°n5
related Notes. . . . (Emphasis added.)' '
^
«

is clear that Donald Dwyer only agreed to ho!d harmless the

cromars for all obiigations contained i„ the two trust deeds
-d

notes, .including reasonable attorney's

fees,.

Nothing

ls

contained in the Agreement Surviving Heal estate Closing about
the payment of attorney's

fees for enforcing

said

agreement

The court concludes that third party defendant Donald Dwyer's
Notice of Objection to Proposed

Judgment is well taKen.

The Court's Minute Entry of August u
, , „ (=
»
" . 1992 is corrected to
stnfce the award of attorney's fees. T n e s u b m i t t e d ^
^
Judgment have been modified by interlineation
-lings herein contained.

Said Order and Judgment

signed and entered, as modified, this
1992.

to reflect the

2 oth

day of

have been
November

copies of sa£d Order and Judgment are returned herewith. '

Dated this Z°

day of November, 1992,.

RIGTRUP
COURT JUDGE

00031?

